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Alternative Education Finance Strategies
Thomas J. Nechyba
argue that, while unequal funding is part of the
story, a deeper underlying root cause for the current
inequities arises from the fact that public schools—
just like private schools—are “priced.” For public
schools, such pricing emerges through housing
markets that fundamentally limit choice dispro-
portionately for disadvantaged families who, as
a result, end up in the worst public schools. The
“quasi-public” nature of public schools that
emerges from this pricing then implies unequal
distributions of nonfinancial inputs into public
schools—implying that equalization of financial
resources cannot be expected to result in equal-
ization of educational opportunities.
State finance strategies that are aimed mainly
at equalizing financial inputs into public schools
are thus limited in the degree to which they can
address the root causes of inequities in public
school systems. Using a model developed over the
past decade and calibrated to real-world data, I
will argue that such strategies do not fundamentally
E
ducation finance policies affect the
incentives of a variety of different indi-
viduals, which implies that a thorough
analysis of trade-offs faced by policy-
makers must be rooted in an understanding of how
individual responses to incentives shape policy
outcomes. In this paper, I will consider two broad
categories of state finance strategies: traditional
strategies based on providing state aid to local
public school districts and more recent strategies
based on providing aid directly to parents. Under-
standing the potential impacts of these different
strategies must first and foremost be based on a
realistic assessment of the economic forces that
shape our current mix of public and private school
systems. Although the large inequities within the
public system in the United States are widely
recognized, the underlying root causes are often
caricatured as deriving primarily from unequal
levels of financing of public schools due to exces-
sive reliance on local sources of funding. I will
Differences in the formulas states use to fund education account for some of the equity issues in
education finance. But the implicit pricing of public school access through housing markets plays
a much larger role by rationing valuable nonfinancial inputs into schools that are disproportionately
attended by children from higher-income households. This paper then considers two broad cate-
gories of state finance policies: those that channel funds to traditional local public schools and
those that instead channel such funds to parents or school entrepreneurs. Both types of policies
can be targeted in various ways to address equity concerns related to financial school inputs, but
the latter allows for a greater severing of the link between school access and housing markets and
thus opens a way for addressing inequities in nonfinancial input allocations. The paper concludes
that state policies should aim at a greater balance between the two types of state aid. 
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are rationed by housing markets that produce sys-
tematically different levels of nonfinancial inputs
in different public school districts and neighbor-
hoods by “bundling” school and housing choices.
State finance strategies that aim aid directly at
parents have the potential to “unbundle” housing
and schooling decisions—thus addressing the
root cause of inequities more directly through the
introduction of choice for disadvantaged families.
Although such strategies unambiguously result in
a reduction in residential segregation, the degree
to which they produce greater educational oppor-
tunities depends on assumptions one makes regard-
ing the nature of private school competition—and
the way in which such strategies are targeted and
designed. The potential of such strategies to address
root causes of current inequities more directly, how-
ever, implies that future reforms of state financing
of education will likely have to involve a greater
balance between strategies that target aid to schools
and strategies that target aid to parents. Such reform
has the potential to not only help increase educa-
tional opportunities but also address some of the
fiscal challenges of urban areas in some parts of
the United States.
Section 1 begins with an overview of some of
the central challenges faced by education finance
policymakers, suggesting that close attention to
how policy affects the distribution of households
across schools is central to sound education policy.
Section 2 then provides a conceptual overview of
the economic root causes of inequities in public
education, drawing in part on previous simulation
work to determine the magnitudes of competing
effects. In Section 3, I discuss the potential for
traditional school finance strategies to narrow
inequities within the public system while main-
taining incentives for efficient decisionmaking.
Section 4 proposes a conceptually different way
of thinking about state education finance policy,
focusing state aid more directly on parents rather
than school districts. Finally, Section 5 concludes
with some thoughts on how education finance
policy might benefit both schools and cities if the
alternative strategies discussed in the previous
two sections were applied in a more balanced way. 
THE COMPLEXITIES OF 
EDUCATION FINANCE POLICY
Education policy unfolds within a complex
economic environment in which multiple actors
make choices that shape the observable outcomes
of policy. Some of these actors are directly or inten-
tionally affected by the incentives contained in
the policy and others are only indirectly and often
unintentionally affected. Predicting the outcome
of policy changes must therefore involve an analysis
of how changing incentives aggregate, moving the
economic environment from its pre-intervention
equilibrium to a new equilibrium in which all
actors do the best they can given their changed
circumstances. Much of what makes education
policy challenging, then, derives from the multiple
channels through which changes in behavior may
influence the ultimate outcomes we observe.
Whose Behavior Might Change?
It is natural to think first of those individuals
in the economy who are directly affected by changes
in education finance policies.
Local governments and school officials (includ-
ing teachers), for instance, pay close attention to
the ways in which higher-level governments struc-
ture aid, with increasing empirical evidence sug-
gesting responses to even small changes in policy.1
Their motivation derives in part from local voter
preferences and in part from incentives within local
bureaucracies that favor “gaming” the system to
maximize revenue.
Local voters may also internalize policy
changes, extending greater or less support to local
schools depending on incentives contained within
school finance formulas. Some voters—in particular,
those with children—might pay close attention to
how their voting choices affect local public schools,
while others might be more concerned about the
impact of such changes on local property values.
Among the latter, renters face different incentives
than homeowners, with homeowners concerned
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1 Various recent empirical papers suggest that school officials respond
directly to changing incentives in both financing and accountability
rules. See, for instance, Cullen (2003), Cullen and Reback (2002),
Figlio and Winicki (forthcoming), Figlio and Getzler (2002), Jacob
(2005), and Jacob and Levitt (2003). about protecting their wealth, which is typically
concentrated disproportionately in their housing
investments.2
In addition, parents face choices within a local
economy—ranging from whether to send children
to public or private schools, whether to live in
“better” or “worse” school or neighborhood districts
within the local economy, and how much effort to
put into monitoring local schools and investing in
their children’s education at home.3 And children
themselves may change their behavior depending
on how school policy affects their peer environment
and their parents’ level of involvement.4
School entrepreneurs, both inside and outside
the public system, determine how much effort to
invest in employing innovative new strategies and
whether or not to set up new private, charter, or
magnet schools.5 School policy might even impact
how land developers and landlords determine
where to build new housing and whether to invest
in renovating older housing within a local econ-
omy—all depending on how school policy affects
demand for different types of housing in different
areas. 
The Need for Non-Price Rationing in
School Markets
In equilibrium, all of these actors seek to do
the best they can, given what others are doing and
how others’ behavior affects their own economic
circumstances. In the end, something determines
which students end up in which school, which
teachers teach in which classrooms, what resources
teachers and school officials have available to them,
and how this translates to the delivery of school
services to different households. This point is far
from trivial. In a typical economic market—say, for
instance, the car market—the equilibrium rationing
mechanism is straightforwardly governed by market
prices. Individuals who like expensive cars and
have the resources to buy them end up with expen-
sive cars, whereas those who place less value on
car services and those whose resources are more
limited end up with lower-end car models. As
conditions affecting the car market change—for
instance, as gasoline prices increase or as govern-
ments introduce different forms of environmental
regulations—prices adjust as both demand and
supply for different car models change. A new
equilibrium then emerges with potentially different
allocations of cars to individuals—all rationed by
the price mechanism.
School policy is challenging in large part
because the rationing mechanisms are more subtle
than they are in car markets. Public schools are
nominally “free” in the sense that no tuition prices
govern who has access to such schools. If this were
the end of the story, public school quality would
have to equalize across all public schools as no
parent—regardless of how much or how little she
values school quality—would ever choose an infe-
rior school. Public school quality in the real world
is not, of course, equal across all schools, which
must mean that there exist other non-tuition ration-
ing mechanisms that cause some parents to end up
sending their children to bad public schools while
others send their children to good public schools.
Similarly, teacher salaries are often controlled by
rigid salary scales—implying that there must exist
non-wage rationing mechanisms that determine
where good teachers and bad teachers end up
within the public system. In private school markets,
more explicit price rationing is possible as private
schools set private school tuitions. But such schools
might supplement price rationing with other mech-
anisms, using, for instance, admissions policies to
screen applicants.
Similar non-market factors play a role in deter-
mining what level of financial resources different
schools have available to them. In car markets, the
level of investment undertaken by car manufac-
turers is determined by profit considerations, with
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2 Recent work on voting in California suggests the importance of
property value considerations for homeowners (Brunner, Thayer,
and Sonstelie, 2001; Brunner and Sonstelie, 2003). Fischel (2001)
provides a broad overview of the connection between home values
and local government behavior.
3 The evidence on parental choices about schools is most rooted in a
long empirical literature (starting with Oates, 1969) documenting
the capitalization of school quality into property values.
4 Harris (1998) documents a substantial psychology literature suggest-
ing such peer influences, and Cooley (2005) models such peer-related
behavioral changes in an empirical framework.
5 Private school markets have demonstrated an ability to respond
relatively quickly to changes in economic circumstances, as evidenced
(for instance) by the quick emergence of new private schools in
California in the late 1970s (Downes and Greenstein, 1996).manufacturers considering whether additional
investments in improving cars will result in more
or less profit given what they know about consumer
demand. Funding for public schools, on the other
hand, is driven by political markets, with voters
and interest groups ultimately determining how
much is invested where—and with the set of voters
determined by decisions made in housing markets.
Private schools must operate more like car manu-
facturers in that they can afford additional invest-
ments in schools only to the extent to which parents
(or charitable contributors) are willing to pay for
such investments.
The Role of Equilibrium Non-Price
Rationing 
Ultimately, whether governed by market prices
or non-price mechanisms, an equilibrium is char-
acterized by supply equaling demand in school
markets and housing markets—and by voter prefer-
ences being aggregated through some voting mech-
anism. But the process by which supply becomes
equal to demand is crucial for understanding how
policy can affect equilibrium outcomes.
I will argue that, in most U.S. contexts, the
most important rationing mechanism within the
public system is generated by the close link of
housing and school markets. Typically, the right
to access a particular public school is given to those
who reside within politically drawn geographic
boundaries that define attendance zones associated
with each public school. If I want my child to access
public school A, the best way to ensure such access
is by purchasing or renting a residence within the
attendance zone of that school. Over three decades
of empirical work has now conclusively established
that housing markets then “price” such access.6
Put differently, the “price” of attending a particular
public school is incorporated into the cost of hous-
ing. Good schools are associated with considerably
“inflated” housing prices, while bad schools are
associated with “depressed” housing prices. In any
given distribution of housing quality across school
attendance zones, the housing market substitutes
for a public school tuition market by pricing or
“rationing” access to most public schools. 
In addition, it is important to recognize that
housing quality is not randomly distributed across
school attendance zones. Even if that were the case,
housing price differences would ration access to
schools. But, in addition, the distribution of housing
within local economies arises not only from market
forces but also from a combination of political fac-
tors that govern both the drawing of attendance
zone boundaries and zoning regulations that set
minimum housing quality in different neighbor-
hoods. As a result, good public schools tend to
reside within attendance zones in which there exist
disproportionately high levels of high-quality
housing; moreover, all housing prices in that zone
are higher than prices for equivalent-quality hous-
ing in attendance zones with bad public schools.
The combination of housing price differentials for
equal quality housing and differences in housing
quality distributions then rations who will attend
which school within the public system. 
This rationing mechanism is sometimes supple-
mented by other forms of rationing. Charter and
magnet schools, for instance, are often not as explic-
itly linked to geographic attendance zones—with
some form of lottery system or merit-based admis-
sions resolving instances of excess demand. In some
“open enrollment” districts, attendance zones grant
immediate rights of access to particular schools but
parents may apply to attend schools outside their
attendance zone conditional on available space
within the school of interest. In such instances,
commuting costs to schools as well as lottery sys-
tems that ration limited space in desirable schools
might ration who transfers out of their local atten-
dance zone. And private schools, as already noted,
may combine explicit price rationing through
tuition policies with other forms of screening
mechanisms of applicants.
The labor markets for teachers and other school
officials are subject to similar rationing considera-
tions. To the extent to which wage differences
across schools are constrained by government or
union policies, again something else determines
where teachers are assigned. Within a large public
school district, for instance, good teachers may be
compensated not by disproportionately high wages
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6 This work began with Oates (1969) and is summarized in Epple and
Nechyba (2004). but rather by “better” assignments to schools and
classes with fewer challenges.7 Even within schools,
quality differences between teachers or tracks
require some rationing mechanism that allocates
students to classrooms. 
Implications of Rationing for “Peer
Quality” Inputs to School Quality
The reason why the “rationing” mechanism of
students into schools and teachers into classrooms
is so important is that it has direct implications
for the nonfinancial set of inputs into school pro-
duction that I will broadly call “peer inputs.” By
peer inputs, I mean any nonfinancial input that has
some correlation to characteristics of households.
Peers themselves may affect each other’s educa-
tional experience—implying that nonrandom
assignment of peers into schools will result in dif-
ferent school qualities even if all financial inputs
are identical. Similarly, the nonrandom selection
of parents into schools is likely to have an impact
on school quality, with some parents providing
greater human capital at home and paying system-
atically more attention to monitoring what happens
in schools and disciplining how school resources
are used. And teacher assignments are likely to
favor children whose parents monitor schools more
closely and whose children are viewed as “easier”
to educate. The characteristics of households that
attend a particular school may therefore shape
school quality through multiple channels, and the
rationing mechanism used to allocate households
to schools determines the quality of nonfinancial
inputs.
QUASI-PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
SCHOOLS WITHIN A LOCAL
ECONOMY
Public schools are often held up as an ideal
that delivers equal opportunity to quality educa-
tion for all children while internalizing important
societal goals that would be absent in a private
school system. Since access to private schools is
priced, it is natural to assume that purely private
school markets would exhibit segregation by eco-
nomic class (and potentially by race to the extent
to which class correlates with race and the extent
to which parents have preferences biased against
particular racial or ethnic groups). The public
school ideal holds out the hope that this can be
avoided through publicly funded “free” schools
that admit all. Furthermore, schools may perform
important functions, such as building respect for
diversity that forms the foundation for a more har-
moniously functioning political climate when
children become voters. However, even parents
who care about living in a well-functioning society
may discount this role of schools for their particular
children in favor of emphasizing the building of
marketable human capital that can more directly
benefit their children. Private schools, it is argued,
therefore do not have sufficient incentive to inter-
nalize these larger societal goals, whereas the public
school ideal holds out hope that it can, through
the political process, accomplish such goals more
effectively.
Although it is difficult to quarrel with the
public school ideal of equal opportunity for all and
an appropriate internalization of societal aims, it is
crucial to recognize that the structure of the public
system in the United States is in many ways set up
much more like a private system; thus, the public
system is far from being optimally positioned to
implement the public school ideal. It is therefore
worthwhile to consider briefly how the public
system in the United States might more aptly be
characterized as a quasi-public system that contains
the element of taxpayer financing shared with a
public system but also the pricing or rationing
mechanism of a private system that does not
explicitly aim for the public school ideal.
Quasi-Pricing of Public Schools and
Inequities in Public Education
It is no secret that public school quality varies
greatly within local economies, with public school
quality directly related to the income of parents—
and with most states having experienced legal
challenges to public school financing systems as a
result. Because legal challenges have been based
largely on observed per-pupil spending differences,
the policy discussion emerging from these court
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7 See, for instance, Loeb and Page (2000).cases has focused primarily on the role of local
financing of public schools.
It is certainly true that, to the extent to which
marginal funding for schools comes from local tax
bases, spending inequities across public schools
can be linked directly to local funding. It does not
follow, however, that local funding of schools is
the only—or even the primary—reason for differ-
ences in school quality. In fact, a long literature on
the role of financial resources in public education
has cast doubt on the extent to which such funding
differences play a large role in undermining the
public school ideal of equal opportunity for all.8
A fuller appreciation of the root causes of
inequities in public education emerges from a fuller
appreciation of the role of quasi-public pricing of
schools. Suppose, for instance, schools were in fact
equally funded but inputs such as teacher and peer
(and parental input) quality play a large role in
shaping schools. Teacher-rationing mechanisms
are likely to place good teachers in schools with
students who have higher socioeconomic status
(SES) (i.e., those viewed as “easier” to teach), and
parents who have the resources to invest in their
children outside school and thus create positive
peer characteristics are likely to live in higher-
income neighborhoods. Thus, multiple channels
exist through which public school quality differ-
ences can emerge, even in the absence of funding
differences; and these quality differences will be
priced in housing markets as discussed in the pre-
vious section. Differences in household income will
then lead to higher-income households enrolling
their children in better public schools through the
quasi-pricing in housing markets.
Inequities in public education may therefore
arise in part from a history of local financing of
public schools, but increasing evidence suggests
that it is primarily due to larger economic forces
within urban and suburban economies that are
tightly linked to differential access to schools and
the resulting nonrandom assignments of parents,
students, and teachers, which in turn results in
unequal levels of nonfinancial inputs. The quasi-
pricing of public schools through housing markets
implies that the very type of school segregation
feared under a private system is, at least to some
degree, present in the quasi-public system.
Private Schools in a Quasi-Public System
We can then think about the role played by
private schools in local economies characterized
by quasi-public school systems. Recall that such
systems lead to substantial distortions of prices in
housing markets—with a premium added to hous-
ing prices in good school districts beyond housing
(and neighborhood) characteristics, and an analo-
gous reduction in housing prices in poor school
districts. For private schools, this opens a potential
competitive advantage over quasi-public schools
since private schools do not ration access by draw-
ing geographical attendance zones. In essence, the
distortions of housing prices arising from the quasi-
public nature of public schools create incentives
for private school entrepreneurs to open schools in
areas with depressed housing prices (i.e., in poorer
areas) because this will then permit parents to
“unbundle” their housing choice from their school
quality choice and take advantage of “bargains” in
the housing market. 
Of course this unbundling is not the only
competitive advantage enjoyed by private schools.
Private schools may be more “efficient” in the sense
of producing more quality per dollar; they may be
able to horizontally differentiate themselves by
offering different pedagogical approaches aimed at
particular types of students; and they may be able
to “cream skim” good peers from public schools and
thus create “high peer quality” schools by rationing
entry into the school by means other than tuition
policies (Nechyba, 2005). Regardless of which other
competitive advantages such schools exploit, how-
ever, the quasi-public nature of public schools
linked to housing markets creates an incentive for
private schools to emerge in lower-income areas—
or at least areas where average income is below the
average income of private school attendees.
Quasi-Public Schools, Private Schools,
and Residential Segregation
While the quasi-pricing of public schools
through housing markets therefore introduces a
segregating force into local economies, the ability
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8 See, for instance, Hanushek (1999).of private schools to de-couple housing from school-
ing choices introduces a desegregating force. This
is not to say that such schools will necessarily be,
in themselves, more integrated than public schools;
rather, even if private schools appeal to a homoge-
neous clientele and thus segregate certain types of
students coming from the quasi-public school sys-
tem, this nevertheless reduces residential segrega-
tion and with it the housing price dispersion created
by the link of housing to quasi-public schools.
To give some indication of how important the
bundling of public schools and housing markets
is—and what role private schools might be playing
in such an economic environment—I have formu-
lated a general equilibrium model with multiple
school districts; a competitive private school market
that has the ability to “cream skim” good peers from
public schools; and a housing market with (i) differ-
ent mixes of housing qualities in different districts
and (ii) residents/voters that face different economic
circumstances.9 In Nechyba (2003b), this model is
calibrated to New Jersey data on households, hous-
ing markets, and public school spending records.
With the appropriate New Jersey system of school
finance modeled as a baseline, this model success-
fully replicates important features of the data—
such as distributions of income and housing prices
across school districts, observed spending patterns
in public schools, and appropriate levels of private
school activity.10 I will repeatedly refer to simula-
tion results from this model (which is also applied
in Nechyba, 2003c) and begin in Table 1 by reporting
some hypothetical experiments to illustrate the
importance of the interaction of private and quasi-
public schools.
The first row of Table 1 reports simulation
results from the model in the absence of public
schools and thus with no school-induced housing
price distortions. The values in this row are there-
fore a benchmark for what housing prices and levels
of income segregation one would expect simply
given the housing (and neighborhood) quality dis-
tributions in the New Jersey data. The next two rows
of the table then simulate the functioning of a
quasi-public school market in the absence of private
schools under either strictly local or strictly state
(equalized) funding. Regardless of how public
schools are funded, whether entirely through local
tax bases or equally through state funding, the
model predicts stark increases in residential income
segregation and a substantial increase in the inter-
district variance of housing prices. Finally, the last
Nechyba
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Table 1
The Role of Quasi-Public School Pricing in Local Economies
Average district income Average district property value
Low- Middle- High- Low- Middle- High-
Private Public school  income income income income income income 
schools allowed financing district district district district district district
Yes None $25,700 $50,175 $67,325 $158,327 $227,189 $266,474
No Local property tax $17,628 $39,647 $85,925 $101,683 $204,075 $392,402
State income tax $19,875 $42,250 $81,075 $102,086 $220,725 $387,549
Yes Local property tax $29,725 $50,262 $63,212 $123,224 $211,729 $294,825
State income tax $29,891 $51,309 $62,000 $118,486 $226,345 $316,308
NOTE: Dollar values are expressed in 1990 dollars.
SOURCE: Nechyba (2003b,d and 2004).
9 This model was first presented in Nechyba (1999), further developed
in Nechyba (2000), and presented in a less technical form in Nechyba
(2003a). 
10 The base model assumes that private schools, in addition to locational
advantages discussed above, seek to select attractive peer groups
and thus engage in “cream skimming” of good peers from public
schools. Alternative versions of the model include other types of
private school advantages with little change in the prediction of
how policy affects local economic environments.two rows of the table introduce private school
markets into the quasi-public school environment.
Although housing prices across districts still capi-
talize local public school quality, housing values
in poor districts rise as private schools allow resi-
dents there to de-couple their housing and schooling
choices. More remarkable, however, is the substan-
tial narrowing of residential income segregation
resulting from the introduction of a private school
market, with less segregation than would exist were
there no school-induced price distortions at all (as
in row 1). This effect is due to the fact that, given
the negative capitalization of poor public schools
into housing values, households with children
enrolled in private schools (whose income tends
to be larger than the average income of the poor
districts) have an added incentive to reside in
higher-quality housing within the poor district.
After providing this background of how quasi-
public and private school markets interact, I am
now ready to discuss two conceptually different
types of school finance policies. The first, labeled
“Strategy 1” in the next section, is aimed at achiev-
ing greater funding equity within the quasi-public
system through differential aid based on local
characteristics. The second, labeled “Strategy 2”
in Section 4, instead aims aid directly at parents
to increase “choice,” particularly for those house-
holds whose choices are limited given the quasi-
public school rationing mechanism that is in place.
STRATEGY I: EQUALIZING PUBLIC
SCHOOL RESOURCES
The first broad category of school finance strate-
gies is focused on finding ways of achieving greater
equity in terms of per-pupil resources within the
quasi-public school sector. Most state policy debates
over the past few decades essentially are debates
about the effectiveness of different ways of accom-
plishing such equalization, with attempts to balance
local discretion with state equity goals. The distin-
guishing characteristic of this class of strategies is
that it tacitly assumes funding differences lie at
the base of observed inequities—and consequently
focuses on providing additional financial resources
to financially disadvantaged schools. 
Within this class of school finance strategies,
one can distinguish between a variety of different
conceptual approaches. First, state aid may come
in the form of block grants based on the underlying
characteristics of a school district, or it may come
in the form of matching grants that depend on
local tax effort, with the match rate determined by
the underlying characteristics of a school district.
Second, state finance policies may or may not place
limits on the degree to which local districts can
supplement state aid through local revenues beyond
some predetermined amount. Put differently, a
key feature of any combination of state financing
strategies is the extent to which marginal school
funding comes from state versus local sources.
Finally, state aid to districts can vary in the degree
to which it is targeted to particular characteristics
of districts (such as low income).11
I begin with two extreme cases: pure local and
pure state funding. Under local financing, each
dollar (including the marginal dollar) of spending
is derived from local tax bases, whereas under state
financing each dollar (including the marginal dollar)
comes from a statewide tax. Given that higher-
income districts pay more in state taxes, state fund-
ing implicitly transfers money from rich to poor
districts.
The Limits of Equalization: Pure Local
versus Pure State Funding
If per-pupil spending were the only input that
mattered in education production, equalization of
spending through state funding would eliminate
inequities. In the presence of other “peer” inputs
into education production, however, equalization
of per-pupil spending eliminates inequities only
to the extent to which current inequities arise from
local and unequal financing. The challenge for
predicting the impact of state equalization is then
to merge theory and data in a way that permits us
to quantify the different channels through which
inequities are currently maintained within the
public or quasi-public system.
The model first developed in Nechyba (1999)
and extended in Nechyba (2000) and Ferreyra
Nechyba
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11 See, for instance, Hoxby (2001) for empirical evidence on the
importance of these distinctions. (2005) takes up this challenge by modeling school
quality as a function of per-pupil financial resources
and other factors broadly labeled as “peer effects.”
As already noted earlier, by “peer effects” I mean
not only the exogenous and endogenous effects
peers have on one another in a school or a class-
room,12 but also other nonpriced inputs that are
correlated with characteristics of peers. For instance,
a student may be considered of “higher peer qual-
ity” if she has parents that invest in the public
school by monitoring school performance or if she
is the type of student who attracts good teachers
in a system in which high-quality teachers are
assigned to “better” classroom environments.
Within such a model, the structure of the model
then has implications for how well private schools
can compete with quasi-public schools and how
housing prices within a local economy evolve. For
now, let us assume that the primary competitive
advantage of private schools (aside from permitting
an unbundling of school and housing choices)
derives from their ability to “select” peer groups.
If the school production technology assumed in
the model places “too much” weight on per-pupil
financial resources, private schools then do not have
a sufficient advantage to compete with quasi-public
schools and housing markets do not incorporate
empirically plausible levels of school capitalization.
If, on the other hand, the model places “too much”
weight on peer effects, quasi-public schools cannot
compete with private schools—leading to an equi-
librium dominated by empirically implausible
levels of private school attendance.13 Thus, the
structure of a general theoretical model of quasi-
public and private school markets—when matched
to important characteristics of the data—can place
appropriate weights on the role of per-pupil finan-
cial resources and “peer effects.” Such weights may
then be interpreted as actual weights in the school
production function or as the weights valued by
parents as they evaluate school quality. 
The empirically relevant versions of a theoreti-
cal model of quasi-public and private schools then
place substantial weight on both per-pupil resources
and peer effects; and, because of the weight on peer
effects, equalization of per-pupil resources is limited
to the extent that it can produce a substantial nar-
rowing of public school inequities. Table 2 below
reports results from such a model that compares the
baseline result from the hybrid state/local system
in New Jersey to results from the radically different
choices of pure local public school financing and
equalized state financing, again within a version
of the model calibrated to be consistent with data
from New Jersey. 
The first row of the table illustrates the impact
of the school financing formula used in the three
sets of simulations: It shows that the per-pupil fund-
ing under a purely local system is over twice as
high in the wealthy district as in the poor district,
with per-pupil funding under the state-financed
system fully equalized and the New Jersey hybrid
system falling in between the extremes. The second
row of the table, however, illustrates much less
dramatic effects of school financing on nonfinancial
inputs (i.e., peer composition) within quasi-public
schools, resulting in a smaller narrowing of overall
public school quality achieved through centraliza-
tion of financing than one would expect from sim-
ply per-pupil spending effects. In addition, average
per-pupil spending in the system falls under cen-
tralized financing for political economy reasons
described in the literature predating this work.14
This implies that, although centralization is pre-
dicted to result in a narrowing of inequities within
the public system, average school quality will suffer
under full equalization as fewer financial resources
flow into the system.
Private school attendance changes in somewhat
subtle ways across the three systems, with the
model predicting an overall decline in private
school attendance under centralized financing.15
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12 See Manski (1993) for the distinction between different types of
peer effects and an exposition of the econometric difficulties of
identifying them independently. 
13 This result is due to the fact that the model assumes either that private
schools can select peers or that such schools have other competitive
advantages discussed in more detail in Nechyba (2005). 
14 Sontelie and Silva (1995) illustrate that average spending levels
(under majority rule voting) depend approximately on mean state
income under local financing and on median state income under
state financing. Given the skewed nature of state income distributions
(also reflected in the calibrated model on which Table 2 is based),
this implies greater average spending under local financing.
15 This is discussed in detail in Nechyba (2003c). Although the subtleties of how private school
attendance changes across districts are not central
to the purpose of this paper, it is important to note
that the prediction that centralization results in a
decline in private school attendance is somewhat
at odds with the experience in California (which has
come closest to fully equalizing per-pupil spending),
where private school attendance increased after
centralization of public school financing. This sug-
gests that, in the real world (but not in the model),
centralization results in additional declines in
public school quality that are not captured by the
structure of the model used here. 
The main point of Table 2, however, is simply
that, because school quality is determined only in
part by per-pupil financial resources, there are limits
to what school finance equalization can achieve
and trade-offs emerge between average quality and
the degree of inequity within the public system.
The underlying economic forces that cause persist-
ence of inequities even under full equalization can
then be found in the combination of (i) the impor-
tance of nonfinancial inputs into education and
(ii) the sorting of peers, parents, and teachers that
is implied by the quasi-public nature of public
school markets linked to local housing markets. 
Block Grants with and without Local
Funding
Most state finance systems contain elements
of local financing supplemented by elements of
state financing provided through some form of
grant system in which block or “lump sum” grants
may play a role. Equalized state financing is an
extreme version of a block grant system in which
local districts are not permitted to supplement state
funds from local revenue sources. Less extreme
versions might be differentially targeted to poorer
districts and might permit local jurisdictions to
supplement state funding through local tax sources. 
The theory of block grants suggests that such
grants—so long as they permit but do not require
additional local financing—have little effect on per-
pupil spending unless the block grants are suffi-
ciently large to cause local districts to choose no
additional spending. This is because districts can
“undo” block grants by reducing their local funding
levels. A sufficiently large universal block grant
system that provides the same amount per pupil
to all districts will then have a differentially large
impact in poor districts, whose spending levels
would be below the block grant level in the absence
Nechyba
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Table 2
The Limits of Equalization
Decentralized system  Decentralized  Centralized 
plus N.J. state formula  local property tax state income tax 
Low- Middle- High- Low- Middle- High- Low- Middle- High-
income income income income income income income income income 
district district district district district district district district district
Per-pupil spending $6,652 $7,910 $8,621 $5,000 $7,326 $10,215 $7,195 $7,195 $7,195
Peer inputs 0.2684 0.4701 0.6521 0.2613 0.5142 0.6404 0.2826 0.5469 0.6470
School quality 0.4322 0.6178 0.7803 0.3674 0.6192 0.8183 0.4616 0.6316 0.6841
Average spending $7,753 $7,731 $7,195
Average quality 0.6152 0.6204 0.5960
District income $31,120 $46,216 $65,863 $29,725 $50,262 $63,212 $29,891 $51,309 $62,000
Property values $117,412 $205,629 $292,484 $123,224 $211,729 $294,825 $118,486 $226,345 $316,308
% Private 20% 22.5% 12.5% 30% 20% 10% 22.5% 17.5% 15%
NOTE: Dollar values are expressed in 1990 dollars.
SOURCE: Nechyba (2004).of state financing.16 The empirical literature on
block grants, however, suggests that local political
institutions tend to function in such a way that they
do not fully “undo” block grants by reducing local
tax effort, implying that, although block grants
have the greatest marginal impact in districts that
would spend below the block grant level in the
absence of intervention, such grants will have a
significant positive impact on local spending even
in districts where this is not the case.17
So long as block grants can be supplemented
through local funds, it is unlikely that block grant
systems can result in a greater narrowing of public
school quality than could be achieved by full state
equalization (which is equivalent to an equalized
block grant system without allowing localities to
supplement state funding). Consider, for instance,
the equalized state system in Table 2, a system in
which the state provides a $7,195 per-pupil block
grant to all quasi-public schools but prohibits addi-
tional marginal funding from local sources. Then
suppose that that state maintains the block grant
program but permits additional local funding. If
the state can indeed maintain the same per-pupil
block grant level, residents in the wealthiest district
would choose to raise per-pupil funding by over
$2,000 but no district would lower its funding.
Given relatively little change in peer quality under
the two systems, this implies that school quality
rises in the wealthier districts but does not fall in
poorer districts when local funding is permitted
to supplement state funding. Therefore, overall
public school quality rises without quality falling
in any districts. To the extent to which the state’s
goal is to guarantee “adequacy” rather than “equity”
of funding, this would suggest that permitting local
jurisdictions to supplement state financing may
be attractive. 
However, the conclusion that it is desirable to
allow local jurisdictions to supplement state fund-
ing may fail to hold if political forces can influence
the level of the per-pupil block grant. If local tax
sources cannot be used to finance local schools,
then parents in high-income districts have an incen-
tive to vote for large block grants even though only
a portion of their own tax payments will remain
in their district. However, parents in wealthier
districts would prefer to supplement the state block
grants their district receives with local taxes, which
would remain entirely within their local schools;
the less attractive option for them would be to vote
for high block grants funded by statewide taxes that
are paid disproportionately by the wealthy. Thus,
the political equilibrium changes when local juris-
dictions are permitted to supplement state funds—
with less support for block grants from those who
have the high demand for public school spending.
Consequently, public school spending in poor
schools may erode when a policy of permitting
local districts to supplement state funding is intro-
duced into the state-equalized model shown in
Table 2.
I am unaware of any serious modeling of this
trade-off and can therefore offer only a conjecture
about the degree to which political forces might
undermine a block grant system when local juris-
dictions are able to supplement state funding. In
states with sufficiently strong judicial mandates
for adequacy, such mandates impose a constraint
on the degree to which higher-income households
can vote to reduce block grants to rely more on local
sources of revenues. When such mandates are suf-
ficiently strong, one would expect that block grant
systems would be maintained even as local supple-
ments to state funding are permitted. To the extent
that such mandates are not sufficiently strong,
however, one might be concerned about allowing
local jurisdictions to supplement state aid. 
Matching Grants and District Power
Equalization
Many state finance formulas have features that
can be modeled as matching grants—grants that
match local tax efforts in some relation to local
economic conditions. Unlike block grants, matching
grants affect per-pupil spending by reducing the
tax price faced by local voters, giving rise to what
economists refer to as powerful substitution effects
that induce voters to make fundamentally different
trade-offs—substituting away from other (private
and public) spending and toward school spending.
District power equalization represents a system of
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16 Detailed simulation results are reported in Nechyba (2003c, 2004).
17 For an introduction to the literature on the “flypaper” effect, see
Hines and Thaler (1995).matching grants that sets matching rates in inverse
proportion to local tax bases, giving larger tax price
subsidies to poorer districts.
If matching grants are unrestricted, in the
sense that there is no ceiling at which the match
disappears, local jurisdictions will raise spending
until the marginal value of an additional dollar of
spending is equal to the amount that needs to be
raised locally in order to generate a dollar of spend-
ing. Put differently, the marginal value of spending
on schools will necessarily fall below the marginal
cost. This raises clear efficiency concerns in light
of the fact that efficient spending requires that the
marginal cost and benefit of spending are equal to
one another. As a result, unrestricted matching
grants result in inefficiently high levels of spending
unless there are externalities from spending on
schools that are not taken into account by local
voters and governments.18 In the absence of such
externalities, this suggests that matching rates
ought to be zero on the margin. 
This is not, however, an argument against
matching grants—only against unrestricted match-
ing grants. Programs like district power equalization
are motivated primarily by equity concerns that
arise from the fact that local tax bases in quasi-
public school systems differ dramatically and that
equity or adequacy considerations can be addressed
by essentially supplementing local tax efforts in
poorer districts with state matches. Put differently,
equity concerns may trump efficiency concerns in
the design of matching aid.
A second consideration arises from the impact
the grants themselves have on property values.
An extreme version of district power equalization,
for instance, might impose positive match rates in
poorer districts and negative match rates in richer
districts. In essence, such a system taxes local tax
effort in districts with high tax bases and subsidizes
local tax effort in districts with low tax bases. This
will, however, necessarily imply that property
values (and thus tax bases) in poor districts rise
while property values (and thus tax bases) in richer
districts fall. As a result, the potential exists for
such extreme forms of district power equalization
to result in a convergence of property values that
will in part unravel the intent of subsidizing spend-
ing in poor districts and taxing it in rich districts.
The local public finance literature has not settled on
a consistent view on how important this “unravel-
ing” effect is; models such as the one used to gener-
ate simulations in our previous tables suggest
modest effects, and some empirical evidence from
actual district power equalization programs suggest
much larger effects.19
The price effects from matching grants (com-
bined with effects on property values) also have
underappreciated implications for how much dis-
trict power equalization is necessary to equalize
spending across districts. It might seem initially
intuitive, for instance, that a district power equal-
ization program aimed at equalizing per-pupil
spending should set matching rates in such a way
as to allow every district to achieve the same level
of spending with the same local tax rate. Such a
program could in principle involve positive match-
ing rates for poor districts and negative matching
rates for rich districts, or it could involve positive
matching rates for all districts, with disproportion-
ately higher matches for poorer districts. In the
former case, the district power equalization program
can be revenue neutral by simply transferring from
rich to poor districts, whereas in the latter case
the program would have to be supplemented from
general state revenue sources.
The intuition that such a system might lead to
equality of per-pupil spending is, however, funda-
mentally flawed. Although the same local tax rate
would result in the same level of spending, voters
with similar tastes will implement very different
tax rates in different districts because of the tax
price incentives of the system. Empirically based
simulations suggest that full district power equal-
ization would in fact result in an inverse relation-
ship of spending and community income, with
the potential of large defections to private schools
in rich districts.20 Thus, state finance policies using
19 This was suggested in simulations by Inman and Rubinfeld (1979),
and Hoxby and Kuziemko (2004) provide evidence related to Texas
district power equalization. Nechyba (1996, 2004) suggests that,
when housing markets are sufficiently settled, the effect might be
small in magnitude.
20 See, for instance, Feldstein (1975) and Nechyba (1996). 
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18 Such “externalities” would have to be of the type that creates spillover
benefits across jurisdictions. These are treated in more detail in
Epple and Nechyba (2004). matching grants to try to achieve equality of spend-
ing across districts require substantially less dra-
matic district power equalization than our initial
intuition might suggest.
Desirable Features of State Finance
Policies Aimed at Greater Interdistrict
Adequacy or Equity
Our discussion of state finance approaches
began by distinguishing three key features of such
approaches: (i) the mix of block versus matching
grant features of the approach, (ii) the degree to
which marginal spending derives from local
sources, and (iii) the degree to which block or
matching features of the system are targeted to
underlying characteristics of local districts (such
as local tax bases). Pure (equalized) state financing
can be viewed as an extreme form of an equalized
block grant that sets the local tax price for additional
spending at infinity. Foundation aid systems based
on block grants are less extreme in that they provide
differential per-pupil block grants while (usually)
permitting local jurisdictions to supplement fund-
ing from local tax sources, thus setting the marginal
tax price to 1. District power equalization systems,
on the other hand, rely on matching grants that, if
unrestricted, set marginal local tax prices above or
below 1 depending on whether matching rates for
particular districts are positive or negative. 
Efficiency considerations imply that marginal
local tax prices (in the absence of certain types of
externalities) should be set to 1. Put differently, in
the absence of externalities, funding for schools
should come from local sources at the margin to
provide the right incentives for local voters and
governments to ensure that the marginal value
from additional spending is equal to its marginal
cost. This implies that equalized state financing
as well as unrestricted matching aid formulas are
inherently inefficient in the absence of externalities
that cross district boundaries. 
Equity or adequacy considerations, however,
imply that some form of state aid is necessary to
ensure less variance in per-pupil spending. Block
grant programs can achieve this by setting a mini-
mum (“adequate”) level of per-pupil spending that
is funded from state sources while permitting local
jurisdictions to spend more from local sources at a
local tax price of 1. Matching grant programs can
also accomplish this so long as match rates are zero
at the margin. The price incentives of matching
grants furthermore imply that, for any level of
state expenditures, matching grant programs will
induce greater levels of spending than block grant
programs. Although the extent to which state aid
programs affect local property values in ways that
undermine the goals of adequacy or equity is still
in question, it is important that capitalization of
such policies into local property values become part
of the general discussion of state aid programs in
education. Finally, as suggested by our discussion
of Table 2, it appears unlikely that state aid in any
form will have substantial impacts on nonfinancial
inputs into schools—causing little change in the
“peer quality” input that is associated with non-
random sorting of households into districts.
STRATEGY 2: “UNBUNDLING”
THROUGH CHOICE
As discussed in the previous section, the typical
state strategy for addressing adequacy or equity
concerns in education is one that focuses on differ-
ent ways of providing state aid to quasi-public
school districts. Such strategies can be effective,
as I have argued, at managing per-pupil spending
in local districts in ways that can help substantially
reduce the variance of per-pupil spending across
districts. Table 2, however, suggests that such poli-
cies, even when fully equalizing per-pupil spending,
encounter insurmountable difficulties in equaliz-
ing educational opportunities because of nonran-
dom sorting of nonfinancial inputs. And, as argued
in Section 2, these difficulties are rooted in the
quasi-public nature of schools combined with the
importance of nonfinancial inputs into education
(which I have broadly labeled “peer effects”). Put
differently, the underlying economic forces within
local economies and housing markets combined
with the nature of education production necessarily
result in unequal quasi-public schools that limit
opportunities for children from poorer households. 
One possible response to this is to move state
finance systems beyond the goal of equalization of
per-pupil spending and to explicitly recognize in
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the public school system necessitates per-pupil
spending levels that are inversely related to local
income.21 Although such an approach might indeed
result in a narrowing of school quality beyond
what is predicted from equalization, it is doubtful
that such a system would ever be politically feasible
and stable or that higher-income parents would
not defect in large numbers to private schools under
such a system.
A second response to the limits of equalization
is to fundamentally re-conceptualize the nature of
state aid from a model that targets aid to districts
to one that targets aid to parents. The logic behind
such a re-conceptualization arises directly from
the quasi-public nature of public schools and the
economic forces that inherently limit access to
educational opportunities along income lines. As
argued in Section 2, access to public schools is not
“free” but is priced through housing markets and
shaped by historically and politically driven atten-
dance zones across housing markets. Higher-income
parents have their “choice” of public schools due
to their ability to afford housing in all attendance
zones, whereas lower-income parents have a sub-
stantially narrower choice set. Similarly, higher-
income parents have access to private school
markets that is much more limited for lower-
income parents, especially those judged as “low
peer quality” by private schools. At a fundamental
level, state aid to districts does not address the
restriction of choice imposed on poorer parents—
and thus does not address the root economic cause
of inequities in quasi-public systems.
This section will therefore explore the impact
of introducing choice, particularly for lower-
income parents, into a system that has fundamen-
tally restricted such choice. In principle, aid can
be channeled to parents in ways analogous to how
it can be channeled to districts—in “block grants”
through vouchers or tax credits, in “matching aid”
through vouchers that require parental contribu-
tions (in terms of time or money), or through tax
deductibility of private school tuition—in ways
that permit parents to supplement spending on
the margin or ways that prohibit such supplemental
spending and restrict schools to accept the voucher
as payment for tuition. The fundamental difference
in this section is that I consider state aid to parents
rather than to school districts.
The “Unbundling” Effect of Aid to
Parents: Targeting to Households versus
Targeting to Communities under Private
School Cream Skimming
Our discussion of Table 1 has already suggested
the potentially powerful (residentially) desegregat-
ing forces introduced by the existence of private
school markets in quasi-public school economies.
The quasi-pricing of public schools, which
depresses housing values in poor districts while
inflating them in rich districts, provides dramatic
incentives for households at the margin that enroll
their children in private schools to locate in rela-
tively poorer school districts. The introduction of
aid to parents in the form of private school vouchers
(or other types of choice programs that unbundle
residential and school decisions) then simply
enlarges the already desegregating impact of private
schools. 
Employing the same computational model
(calibrated to New Jersey) as in the previous tables,
Table 3 then illustrates the predicted impact of
three different types of vouchers. In each case, let
us assume that parents are permitted to add to the
voucher amount as they pay private school tuition,
and the voucher is given as a “block grant” to par-
ents who use it to send their children to private
schools. The first third of the table assumes that
everyone is eligible for the voucher; the second
assumes that the voucher is restricted to those
residing in the poor district; and the third part of
the table assumes the voucher is restricted to poor
households (earning less than $25,000 per year).22
First, note that in the top portion of the table,
vouchers are used primarily in the poor district
for modest voucher amounts. Approximately one-
third of the predicted effect arises from parents
who resided in the poor district prior to the intro-
22 For greater detail on the assumptions behind results in Table 3, see
Nechyba (2003c, 2004).
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21 The fact that equalization addresses primarily issues of fiscal
capacity but not those of fiscal need (which arises from the lower
level of nonfinancial inputs in disadvantaged communities) has
been understood for some time; see, for instance, Ladd (1976). duction of the voucher, whereas two-thirds of the
effect is due to marginal households from the
middle- and high-income district relocating to the
better houses in the poor district to qualify for the
voucher. Average spending in public schools
declines somewhat but, for modest levels of the
voucher, the ratio of spending in the rich district
to the poor district also declines (as resources in
the poor district’s public school are spread across
fewer students while local tax bases increase). As
the voucher amount increases and the local political
equilibrium “tips,” however, this ratio increases
because political support for public schools in the
poor district declines. When the voucher rises to
$5,000 per pupil (in 1990 dollars), public schools
in the poor district cease to exist.
Because the assumption in this table is that
private schools engage in an extreme form of “cream
skimming” the best students and parents from the
public system, public school quality necessarily
declines, although for modest voucher levels it
declines more in wealthier districts than in the poor
district (because the voucher is disproportionately
used by parents from wealthier districts). The final
column then calculates the per-family tax cost of
publicly funded education, the sum of what is
spent in public schools and the cost of the voucher
system. Because parents are permitted to “top off”
the voucher, their actual cost is higher even as the
publicly incurred cost declines.
Next, consider the middle portion of the table
in which voucher eligibility is restricted to only
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Table 3
Vouchers (under N.J. system) with Private School “Cream Skimming”
Percent in private schools Ratio  of Average Ratio  of
Low- Middle- High- Average  District  3 public District  3 
income income income  state  to District 1  school  to District 1  Net cost 
Voucher amount district district district spending spending quality quality of voucher
Universal voucher eligibility
$0 20% 22.5% 12.5% $7,753 1.296 0.6153 1.805 $0
$1,000 32.5% 22.5% 15% $7,725 1.207 0.6035 1.767 –$175
$2,500 40% 27.5% 22.5% $7,502 1.150 0.5645 1.716 –$330
$4,000 67.5% 40% 30% $6,914 1.556 0.4773 2.339 –$753
$5,000 100% 82.5% 32.5% $7,385 — 0.4220 — –$656
Eligibility restricted to District 1 residents
$0 20% 22.5% 12.5% $7,753 1.296 0.6153 1.805 $0
$1,000 35% 22.5% 12.5% $7,869 1.226 0.5971 1.698 –$182
$2,500 47.5% 30% 15% $7,695 1.197 0.5534 1.616 –$614
$4,000 82.5% 42.5% 15% $7,408 1.623 0.5019 2.460 –$1,280
$5,000 100% 47.5% 17.5% $7,430 — 0.5093 — –$1,321
Eligibility restricted to low-income households
$0 20% 22.5% 12.5% $7,753 1.296 0.6153 1.805 $0
$1,000 20% 22.5% 12.5% $7,753 1.296 0.6153 1.805 $0
$2,500 20% 22.5% 12.5% $7,753 1.296 0.6153 1.805 $0
$4,000 40% 22.5% 12.5% $7,899 1.264 0.6089 2.046 –$140
$5,000 67.5% 20% 10% $7,698 1.710 0.6121 2.783 –$427
NOTE: Dollar values are expressed in 1990 dollars.
SOURCE: Nechyba (2003c, 2004).those households that reside in the poorest district.
Migration into the poor district by middle-income
households now increases, causing “take-up” rates
in the poor district to rise faster than in the top por-
tion of the table. Because private schools attract
clients mainly from this pool of new residents in the
poor district, public schools in the other districts are
affected primarily by the exit of high-quality peers,
with overall spending in public schools changing
less. Still, it is striking how similar the predicted
effects from a universally available voucher (in the
top portion of the table) are to those from a voucher
targeted solely at the poor district (in the middle
portion of the table). The reason for this is that, even
when vouchers are universally available, those who
take up the voucher have a strong incentive to move
to housing in the poor district. 
Finally, the lowest portion of the table considers
targeting to low-income families as opposed to tar-
geting to low-income districts. The predicted impact
of such targeting differs dramatically because it
does not give rise to the residential mobility effects
that arise in the first two portions of the table.
Targeting to low-income parents thus requires
considerably higher voucher amounts for the
voucher to affect the system in a significant way.
The Importance of Assumptions about
Private Schools
So far, we have assumed that the primary com-
petitive advantage of private schools derives from
their ability to select students and thus isolate peer
groups. This necessarily implies that public school
quality must decline as private school markets are
fostered through voucher policies, thus giving us
the bleakest picture regarding the potential impact
of such policies on public schools. The evidence
on the extent to which private schools rely on this
“cream skimming” advantage as their sole tool for
attracting parents is, however, relatively weak. I
therefore consider two alternative assumptions about
private schools to highlight the potential for more
positive impacts of competition on public schools. 
Table 4 reports the impact of different levels of
private school vouchers on public school quality
in each of our three districts, with quality indexed
by 100 for the middle-income district in the absence
of vouchers. The top portion of the table continues
with the assumption of “cream skimming” as the
primary tool used by private schools to compete
against public schools (as in Table 3), illustrating
once again the drop in public school quality in all
districts as universally available vouchers are
introduced. Note again that public school quality
declines in all districts even as private schools
appear primarily in the poor district—because
private schools are “skimming the cream” from all
public schools, not just those in the poor district. 
The second and third parts of Table 4 then
introduce two alternative assumptions about private
schools. In the middle portion of the table, I assume
that children with different “abilities” can be served
better if pedagogical approaches can be tailored to
their needs to the extent to which they are in class-
rooms with similar peers. Although private schools
are still assumed to engage in some cream skim-
ming, they also aim to fill market niches by offering
different types of pedagogical approaches most
suited to the needs of particular types of children.23
Children that remain in the public schools then
exhibit less variance in their characteristics, permit-
ting public schools to also target their approaches
more directly to student needs. The main conclu-
sion from this exercise is that, as less deleterious
motives for private schools are introduced together
with an ability by public schools to become more
effective under competition, the introduction of
vouchers can lead to increases in public school
quality in all districts.
The final portion of the table illustrates a simi-
lar conclusion from introducing yet a third private
school advantage supported by some empirical
evidence. Again, let us continue to assume that
some of the private school advantage derives from
cream skimming; however, private schools are also
assumed to be more efficient at translating finan-
cial resources into school quality, whereas public
schools become more efficient only when exposed
to competition.24 And, as in the middle portion of
23 The simulations assume that approximately half of the private
school advantage still derives from “cream skimming” and half
derives from pedagogical targeting.
24 The pedagogical targeting in the middle portion of the table can in
fact be viewed as a special case of resource efficiency—with private
schools being able to produce more quality with a given set of finan-
cial resources because they can target their curriculum to a narrower
range of student types.
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for public schools to improve in all districts under
assumptions about private schools that are more
favorable for such effects emerging.25
The Robustness of Unbundling to
Different Assumptions about Private
Schools
Although the predicted impact of private school
competition on public school quality therefore
depends on the nature of private school competition
(as illustrated in Table 4), the residential desegre-
gation predicted by the model under greater private
school activity is independent of what form private
school competition takes. Put differently, under
each of the scenarios considered in Table 4, the
interdistrict variance of community income and
housing prices narrows as private school–attending
parents disproportionately choose to reside in
poorer districts as they take up vouchers and
unbundle their school choice from their residential
location choice. 
Implications for Voucher Design
As suggested at the beginning of this section,
state aid targeted to parents can, in principle, take
different forms analogous to the forms state aid can
take when targeted to districts. Thus, vouchers can
in principle have “block grant” features (as in the
tables reported above) or “matching grant” features
(which would attract greater private resources into
education due to the additional “price effect” dis-
cussed in Section 3). Vouchers, like aid to districts,
can be designed to limit additional parent contri-
bution by requiring that private schools accept
vouchers as full payment for tuition, or they can
(as in the tables above) permit households to “top
off” vouchers. And vouchers can be targeted to
households based on where they live (analogous
to targeting state aid differentially to districts) and
to household characteristics (analogous to making
25 See Nechyba (2005) for more discussion of the assumptions that
lead to better or worse public school performance.
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Table 4
Impact of (Universal Vouchers) Under Alternative Private School Assumptions
Voucher amount
$0 $1,000 $2,500 $4,000 $5,000
Public school quality*
Cream skimming only
Poor district 69.97 68.05 65.82 39.83 †
Middle district 100.00 98.80 89.43 78.93 44.59
Wealthy district 126.31 120.22 112.96 93.19 80.27
Cream skimming + pedagogical targeting
Poor district 70.36 76.46 80.55 81.61 76.85
Middle district 100.00 101.52 104.96 105.99 101.55
Wealthy district 131.05 130.11 129.67 131.74 127.02
Cream skimming + competitive resource efficiency
Poor district 65.72 67.42 69.81 71.08 71.74
Middle district 100.00 101.83 104.90 107.68 109.75
Wealthy district 124.64 126.96 128.23 131.24 132.59
NOTE: Dollar values are expressed in 1990 dollars. *Indexed to be equal to 100 in middle-income districts in the absence of vouchers.
†Public school ceased to exist.
SOURCE: Nechyba (2005).state aid to districts dependent on the mix of house-
hold types in each district). 
The main difference between state aid to dis-
tricts and state aid to parents, however, is the inter-
district and interschool mobility of aid under the
latter system but not the former. When state aid to
districts is dependent on the characteristics of
households in each district (as when students with
low SES or learning disabilities imply greater aid
to the district), a household has an incentive to take
into account the impact its residential location
choice has on local schools because the money that
accompanies the household is spread across all
students in the public schools of the district. When
such aid is provided directly to parents, however,
the household is in control of the aid and can use
it at whatever school it chooses, thus introducing
the unbundling effect emphasized here. 
Although this unbundling addresses the central
limitations imposed on poorer households in quasi-
public school economies, it also gives rise to a
number of possible concerns. For instance, if diver-
sity of student populations has important long-
run social effects, for instance, will policies that
foster greater segregation of student types into dif-
ferent schools create future social problems (even
if such policies simultaneously foster greater resi-
dential desegregation)? Or, given that some parents
are less likely to be engaged in their children’s
educational progress, will fostering greater choice
lead some public schools to be composed almost
entirely of students from relatively dysfunctional
families? Would segregation of student types into
more specialized schools improve quality through
educational innovations targeted at the particular
needs of different types of children, or will the seg-
regation result in low-peer-quality students having
even less educational opportunity than they do
under the current quasi-public system? 
Our discussion of the potential for unbundling
of school and residential choices as a means to offer
choice to those most disenfranchised in a quasi-
public school system is not meant to minimize
these concerns. Instead, our discussion of the
quasi-public nature of public schools that bundle
residential and school choices suggests that such
concerns about the potential adverse effects of
increasing choice should raise similar concerns
about public schools as they are presently
designed—because their quasi-public character
already implies a lack of diversity and a dispro-
portionate concentration of children from more
dysfunctional family backgrounds. The potential
of private school choice to lessen residential seg-
regation offers the possibility of greater integration
within communities even as it suggests the possibil-
ity of greater segregation in schools. As illustrated
in Table 4, greater segregation of student types can
have positive or negative effects depending on the
nature of private school competition and public
school responses. Vouchers can, however, in prin-
ciple be designed to address concerns about diver-
sity by requiring such diversity in private schools
that accept vouchers and by varying voucher
amounts based on household and child character-
istics.26 And the introduction of greater private
school choice for poorer parents must certainly be
accompanied by a concerted effort to improve pub-
lic schooling for those—particularly those in poor
districts—whose parents do not exercise choice. 
CONCLUSION: THINKING ABOUT
CITIES AND SCHOOLS TOGETHER
It is well recognized that educational opportu-
nities for children are currently quite dependent
on the economic circumstances of parents. This
paper argues that the economic root cause for this
fact lies in the quasi-public nature of public edu-
cation in most of the United States. Public schools
are “public” in the sense that they are funded
through taxpayer contributions; they are “quasi-
public” in the sense that, while nominally “free,”
access is implicitly priced through housing markets,
thus limiting educational opportunities for poorer
households whose choice of public school is typi-
cally limited to the worst schools in the public
system. As a result, the public system whose ideal
is equal opportunity for all children is one that
disproportionately concentrates poorer house-
holds in worse schools. Furthermore, goals such
as exposing children to diversity within public
schools are, to the extent that they are realized, far
26 Nechyba (2005) discusses implications for voucher design in more
detail.
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proponents.
The inequities inherent in public education in
the United States have been well recognized for
decades, with increasing state efforts (often moti-
vated by court challenges) to use state aid programs
to reduce these inequities. The discussion in this
paper suggests that, although state equalization
programs can indeed ameliorate inequities to some
extent, the quasi-public nature of schools combined
with the importance of nonfinancial inputs into
school production implies severe limits to how
far such policies can go in achieving their aim of
providing equal or even adequate educational
opportunities for all. Although it is possible to
distinguish between different types of traditional
state aid programs in terms of their effectiveness at
achieving greater equity, some important economic
causes of existing inequities—rooted in residential
segregation by income—remain intact.
Over the past decade, an alternative set of fiscal
approaches has therefore emerged.27 These can be
broadly characterized as “choice-based” approaches
that include both the introduction of greater choice
within the public system and the introduction of
greater incentives for private school formation
through voucher policies. These approaches are
aimed more directly at the economic root cause of
inequities in public education, recognizing more
explicitly the relative lack of school choice for
disadvantaged families. The rise of charter schools,
which permit parents to form publicly funded
schools aside from traditional residence-based
schools, is one such approach, whereas the emer-
gence of publicly funded (private school) voucher
programs is another. There is much we do not cur-
rently know about the potential systemic effects
of such programs, as illustrated by our discussion
of the very different predictions regarding the
impact of such programs on traditional public
school quality, depending on assumptions about
the nature of school competition (Table 4). At the
same time, economic models suggest that the
unbundling of school and housing choices permit-
ted under these approaches is likely to have pro-
found impacts on residential segregation.
Our discussion of the differences between
district-based and parent-based education finance
strategies highlights the importance of more explic-
itly recognizing the connection between how cities
evolve and the educational opportunities they offer.
In a public system in which access to public schools
is residence-based, it is not possible to divorce the
analysis of school finance policies from an under-
standing of how city and suburban neighborhoods
are shaped. As was demonstrated in Section 3,
achieving equality in school spending is far from
achieving equality in educational opportunities
when households are not randomly assigned to
residential neighborhoods. Although state aid to
traditional public schools, particularly those serving
disadvantaged families, is surely an important aspect
for any state effort to ensure greater educational
opportunity for all, the fundamental economic
forces that maintain inequities within traditional
public schools require state fiscal policies to pay
increasing attention to those economic forces. Thus,
combining traditional state aid programs with
parent-focused aid that increases choice for the
disadvantaged can become an increasingly impor-
tant component of state aid strategies, with the
aim of increasing educational opportunities while
addressing at the same time some of the economic
challenges faced by cities (and suburbs) whose
populations are too segregated along income lines. 
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